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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________________ 
 
SEITZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Michael E. Murphy ("Plaintiff"), formerly a captain in 
the United States Marine Corps Reserves, initiated an action in 
the district court challenging, inter alia, the authority of the 
United States Marine Corps to recall him to active duty, while a 
member of the Marine Corps Reserves, and to subject him to trial 
by court-martial for offenses committed during a prior period of 
active duty in the regular Marines Corps.  Plaintiff appeals an 
order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of 
the Secretary of the Navy John H. Dalton, et al. ("Defendants").  
The court held that Plaintiff was lawfully recalled to active 
duty and court-martialed in accordance with constitutional 
standards.  The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 I.  FACTS 
 Plaintiff served in the regular component of the United 
States Marine Corps from October, 1981 to May 30, 1988, and 
achieved the rank of captain.  On May 30, 1988, he resigned his 
commission and received an honorable discharge from the regular 
component.  Simultaneous with his discharge, Plaintiff requested 
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and accepted a commission as a reserve officer and transferred to 
the Marine Corps Reserves.  Under this arrangement, Plaintiff had 
no obligated service in the reserves.   
 In or around August 1988, Plaintiff joined a Marine 
reserve unit and participated in inactive duty training. 
Thereafter, charges were preferred against Plaintiff for 
violations of various articles of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice ("UCMJ") for misconduct which occurred during his prior 
period of active duty in the regular component.  Plaintiff was 
called to active duty to face the charges but challenged the 
military's jurisdiction over him.  At the time of his recall, 
Plaintiff was not on active duty or on inactive duty training. 
None of the allegations concerned conduct occurring during the 
period of Plaintiff's inactive duty training in the reserves. 
 Before a general court-martial, Plaintiff pleaded 
guilty to two of five counts against him.  The remaining three 
charges were withdrawn.  Plaintiff was fined $75,000, which was 
suspended, and he was dismissed from the service.  He appealed 
his conviction to the Navy-Marine Court of Military Review which 
affirmed the conviction.  Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a petition 
for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court which was 
denied. 
 After exhausting his military remedies, Plaintiff 
sought relief in the district court.  Plaintiff requested 1) 
compensatory and punitive damages, including attorneys fees, 
against Defendants in their individual capacities, for violation 
of his constitutional rights; 2) compensatory damages under the 
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Federal Tort Claims Act for the intentional and negligent conduct 
of the United States officials; 3) declaratory and equitable 
relief for violation of Plaintiff's constitutional and statutory 
rights; and 4) "a permanent injunction providing for Plaintiff's 
reinstatement in the Marine Corp Reserve with restitution of all 
financial losses and losses of benefits suffered as a result of 
Defendants' conduct[,] and expungement of his conviction, 
dismissal[,] and the record of all proceedings conducted without 
jurisdiction by the Military Courts." (Second Amended Complaint, 
App. at 22.) 
 Motions for summary judgment were made by both 
Plaintiff and Defendants.  The district court dismissed 
Plaintiff's complaint and granted summary judgment for Defendants 
holding that Plaintiff was lawfully recalled to active duty and 
court-martialed in accordance with constitutional standards.  No 
opinion was filed.  Instead, in support of its ruling, the court 
adopted Defendants' memoranda of law as its rationale.  Plaintiff 
filed a timely appeal to this Court.   
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 This case concerns the fundamental question of whether 
the military had continuing jurisdiction over Plaintiff to 
subject him to recall to active duty and subsequent court-
martial.  Resolution of jurisdictional questions such as this are 
historically within an Article III court's jurisdiction. See 
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 753 n.26 (1975)(citing 
United States v. Frischholz, 36 C.M.R. 306, 307 (C.M.A. 1966)). 
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Because we are reviewing the district court's grant of summary 
judgment, our review is plenary.   
 
A.  Elements of Court-martial Jurisdiction 
 Generally, court-martial jurisdiction has three 
elements: (1) the accused must be in a status subject to the UCMJ 
at the time the offense was committed; (2) personal jurisdiction 
must attach at the time of the court-martial; and (3) "the 
accused must be `amenable' to trial by court-martial for the 
alleged offense." See Earle A. Partington, Court-Martial 
Jurisdiction Over Weekend Reservists After United States v. 
Caputo, 37 Naval L. Rev. 183, 194 (1988).  Elements two and three 
are the focus of this appeal. 
 
1.   The Uniform Code of Military Justice 
 The UCMJ provides: 
(a) The following persons are subject to this 
chapter: 
 
 (1) Members of a regular component of 
the armed forces . . . and other persons 
lawfully called or ordered into, or to duty 
in or for training in, the armed forces, from 
the dates when they are required by the terms 
of the call or order to obey it. 
 
 . . . .   
 
 (3) Members of a reserve component while 
on inactive-duty . . . . 
     
10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(1) & (3) (1988).  Those falling into one of 
the categories of persons listed above are said to be in a 
"status subject to the Code."  In the present case, there is no 
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dispute that Plaintiff was in a status subject to the Code at the 
time of the alleged offenses.   
 In order to satisfy the second element, i.e., personal 
jurisdiction, Defendants called Plaintiff into active duty, a 
status subject to the Code, pursuant to the following statutory 
authority: 
(1) A member of a reserve component who is 
not on active duty and who is made the 
subject of proceedings under section 815 
(article 15) or section 830 (article 30) with 
respect to an offense against this chapter 
may be ordered to active duty involuntarily 
for the purpose of-- 
 (A) investigation under section 832 
(article 32) of this title; 
 (B) trial by court martial; or 
 (C) nonjudicial punishment under section 
815 of this title. 
 
(2) A member of a reserve component may not 
be ordered to active duty under paragraph (1) 
except with respect to an offense committed 
while the member was-- 
 (A) on active duty; or 
 (B) on inactive duty training . . . . 
 
10 U.S.C. § 802(d)(1) & (2) (1988) (emphasis added).   Under this 
section, Defendants posit that Plaintiff, as a reserve officer, 
was properly recalled to active duty to face court-martial for 
the offenses committed while he was a member of the regular 
component.  They contend that § 802(d) "expressly authorizes the 
recall of reservists for investigation and court-martial with 
respect to offenses committed on active duty" even if such 
periods of active duty occurred in the regular component.  In 
Defendants' view, because the term "active duty" is not qualified 
in any way it should be given its plain meaning and be applicable 
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to any period of active duty.  Thus, Defendants invoked 10 U.S.C. 
§ 802(d) as the statutory authority for personal jurisdiction 
over Plaintiff, and, by implication, the authority to order him 
to stand trial by court-martial. 
 Contrary to Defendants' position, Plaintiff initially 
argues that the term "active duty" in § 802(d)(2)(A) refers only 
to those periods of active duty served while a reservist.  As 
such, it has no application to situations where the offense was 
committed while on active duty in the regular component.  The 
result, Plaintiff argues, is that § 802(d) cannot be used to 
effect personal jurisdiction. 
 Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that the third element 
of court-martial jurisdiction, "amenability" to trial by court-
martial, cannot be met.  Plaintiff argues that jurisdiction over 
him for past offenses committed during his prior period of 
service was lost after his discharge from the regular component 
of the Marines.  He asserts that to have continuing jurisdiction 
over him for such past offenses requires the application of an 
earlier version of 10 U.S.C. § 803(a), which provided continuing 
jurisdiction over discharged military personnel when certain 
conditions were met.3  Because § 803(a) could not apply, 
Plaintiff argues he is not amenable to jurisdiction.   
                     
3Section 803(a) as applied to Plaintiff provided: 
 
Subject to section 843 of this title, no 
person charged with having committed, while 
in a status in which he was subject to this 
chapter, an offense against this chapter, 
punishable by confinement for five years or 
more and for which the person cannot be tried 
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 Defendants do not rely on the applicability § 803(a). 
Instead, they argue jurisdiction was never lost over Plaintiff 
upon his honorable discharge from the regular component because 
his discharge was handled "simultaneously" with his acceptance of 
a reserve commission.  As such, they assert there was no break in 
service.  We undertake our review beginning with the historical 
development of modern court-martial jurisdiction. 
 
2. The Hirshberg Case 
 Our analysis of modern court-martial jurisdiction 
originates with United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 
U.S. 210 (1949).  Hirshberg, a naval enlisted man, while serving 
a second term of enlistment, was served with charges directing 
his trial by court-martial.  The charges stemmed from misconduct 
that occurred during his prior term of enlistment.  The 
government alleged court-martial jurisdiction under Article 8 
(Second) of the Articles for the Government of the Navy, which 
provided that "such punishment as a court-martial may adjudge may 
be inflicted on any person in the Navy . . . guilty of 
maltreatment of, any person subject to his orders."  The 
government contended that this language authorized the court-
martial for Hirshberg's conduct during a prior enlistment because 
                                                                  
in the courts of the United States or of a 
State, a Territory, or the District of 
Columbia, may be relieved from amenability to 
trial by court-martial by reason of the 
termination of that status. 
 
10 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1988), amended by 10 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1992).  
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Hirshberg was "in the Navy" when the offense was committed and 
when he was tried. Id. at 212-13. 
 The government conceded that had Hirshberg not re-
enlisted he would not have been subject to court-martial because 
of his break in service.  However, the Court pointed out that 
making such concession while "urging such a literal construction 
of article 8 (Second) expose[d] the whimsical and uncertain 
nature of the distinctions that would mark the boundaries of 
court-martial powers." Id. at 213.  Additionally, the Court 
reasoned that "[j]urisdiction to punish rarely, if ever, rests 
upon such illogical and fortuitous contingencies." Id. at 214. 
Thus, out of Hirshberg came the doctrine that military 
jurisdiction over an individual for offenses committed during a 
prior period of enlistment or obligated service lapses after the 
discharge for that period.  Today, "[d]espite the enactment of 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice and various amendments to 
the Code, Hirshberg remains binding precedent." United States v. 
Cortte, 36 M.J. 767, 769 (N.M.C.M.R. 1992)(citing United States 
v. Clardy, 13 M.J. 308 (C.M.A. 1982)).  It is the Hirshberg 
doctrine that applies throughout this appeal. 
3.  Plaintiff's Military Obligation 
 In Defendants' memoranda of law, adopted by the 
district court as its rationale, it is continually argued that 
Plaintiff's discharge was "conditioned" upon further military 
service, to wit, his acceptance of a reserve commission.  This 
was an attempt to show the absence of a complete break in status 
under the Code.  However, this simply is not the case.  At the 
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time Plaintiff entered the Marines, he had a statutory obligation 
of six years of service. See 10 U.S.C. § 651.  After completion 
of these six years, Plaintiff had no further military obligation. 
Consequently, he submitted his resignation, was honorably 
discharged, and accepted a reserve commission.  Discharge orders 
were issued to reflect such facts.     
 If Plaintiff decided not to accept the reserve 
commission, new orders would have been issued honorably 
discharging him with no further military obligation. See Letter 
from Asst. U.S. Attorney Brysh to Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
2 (Oct. 19, 1995) (On file with Clerk's office) [hereinafter 
Brysh Letter].  In a letter from the Commandant of the Marine 
Corps to Plaintiff regarding Plaintiff's resignation, the 
Commandant stated: 
 Your request for resignation . . . is approved. In 
response to your request, you have been considered for 
and are tendered a Marine Corps Reserve commission. 
 
 . . . .  
 
. . . Should you not desire the Reserve commission 
tendered you, the Commandant of the Marine Corps (MMSR-
3) must be notified immediately.  These orders are 
cancelled and new orders will be issued. 
Letter from Commandant of the Marine Corps to Captain Michael A. 
Murphy (April 27, 1988). (App. at 184.)  There is no indication 
from any source in the record that a decision by Plaintiff not to 
request the reserve commission would have changed his military 
obligation.     
 The following discussion contained in the Navy's 
Courts-Martial Regulations also supports Plaintiff's position: 
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A member of a regular or reserve component remains 
subject to court-martial jurisdiction after leaving 
active duty for offenses committed prior to such 
termination of active duty if the member retains 
military status in a reserve component without having 
been discharged from all obligations of military 
service.                       
 
. . . A "complete termination" of military status 
refers to a discharge relieving the servicemember of 
any further military service.  It does not include a 
discharge conditioned upon acceptance of further 
military service. 
 
Discussion to Rules for Courts-Martial 204(d) (1995) (emphasis 
added).  Moreover, Plaintiff's Honorable Discharge Certificate 
contains no conditions to discharge. (App. at 55.)  Lastly, it is 
indicated in a Memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy that 
Plaintiff requested a reserve commission which was "Not 
Obligated." (App. at 60.)  Thus, Plaintiff's military obligation 
was completely terminated in that his discharge was not 
conditioned on further military service, i.e., acceptance of a 
reserve commission. 
 In an attempt to show continuing jurisdiction over 
Plaintiff and avoid the application of Hirshberg, Defendants now 
contend on appeal that because Plaintiff chose to submit his 
resignation with a request for a reserve commission, his 
resignation and acceptance of commission as a reserve officer 
were "handled as a single transaction."  Brysh Letter at 2. 
Therefore, they argue, there was no lapse in military service and 
Plaintiff remained subject to court-martial jurisdiction. 
Defendants have cited no authority to support their position nor 
has any come to our attention.  Even if we were to assume that 
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Plaintiff's resignation and acceptance of a reserve commission 
were handled as a "single transaction," his status under the Code 
still lapsed upon his honorable discharge from the regular 
component.   
 Additionally, Plaintiff's situation is unlike those 
cases holding that there is no interruption in one's "status 
subject to the Code" upon an early discharge for the purpose of 
reenlistment. See, e.g., Clardy, 13 M.J. at 315-16.  
 Defendants also attach some relevance to the fact that 
Plaintiff remained a commissioned officer, albeit a reservist. 
However, this fact is of no consequence.  For it is not "status" 
as a officer which is determinative of court-martial 
jurisdiction; rather, it is status as a person belonging to the 
general category of persons subject to the Code. See United 
States v. Poole, 20 M.J. 598, 600 (N.M.C.M.R. 1985); see also 
United States v. Spradley, 41 M.J. 827, 830 (N.M.C.C.A 1995) 
(noting "`subject to recall' is not the same as `subject to the 
Code'"). 
 It is apparent to this Court that Plaintiff was under 
no obligation to accept a reserve commission.  When discharged, 
Plaintiff's status as a person subject to the Code "completely 
terminated" upon his separation from the regular component, 
notwithstanding his reserve affiliation.  Moreover, Plaintiff did 
not join a reserve unit for more than three months after his 
discharge from the regular component.  This alone evidences a 
clear break in status under the Code.  Accordingly, we hold that 
at the moment Plaintiff's discharge from the regular component 
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became effective, his status as a person subject to the Code 
terminated subject only to a subsequent restoration of that 
status through possible applicable statutory exceptions.  We turn 
to that possibility. 
 
4.  Title 10 U.S.C. § 803 
 Title 10 U.S.C. § 803 is entitled "Jurisdiction to try 
certain personnel."  The section contains exceptions to Hirshberg 
when military jurisdiction is terminated by a discharge at the 
end of a period of enlistment or obligated service.  Because of 
his complete termination in status subject to the Code, Plaintiff 
argues that to have continuing jurisdiction over him, he must be 
brought within the application of 10 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1988). See 
supra note 1.  Before its recent amendment which is not 
applicable to the present facts, § 803(a) acted as a grant of 
continuing jurisdiction, notwithstanding a discharge, when the 
offense committed (1) was punishable by five years or more of 
confinement, and (2) was not triable in any federal or state 
court. 
 It is noteworthy that "[t]he language of [10 U.S.C. 
§803(a)] was drawn to cover only the most serious offenses and 
restricted to those instances in which the guilty would otherwise 
escape trial or punishment in any American courts." United Sates 
ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 27 (1955) (Reed, J., 
dissenting).  Significantly, we note that § 803(a) was never 
tendered by Defendants as a basis for jurisdiction. 
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 Plaintiff ultimately was charged with the following 
violations of the UCMJ: 1) Conspiracy, 2) Fraudulent Separation, 
3) Violation or Failure to Obey Lawful General Order or 
Regulation and Dereliction in Performance of Duties, 4) False 
Official Statement, and 5) Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a 
Gentleman. (See App. at 199-202 (General Court-Martial Order 
containing charges.)  As part of a plea agreement, Plaintiff 
pleaded guilty to charges three and five.  The remaining charges 
were dismissed. Id.  Of the five charges, only two of the five 
were punishable by confinement for five years, i.e., Fraudulent 
Separation and False Official Statement. See Part IV of the 
Manual for Courts-Martial ¶¶ 8(e) & 31(e) and Appendix 12.4 
 The charge for Fraudulent Separation is a separate 
exception to Hirshberg and forms the basis for jurisdiction under 
10 U.S.C. § 803(b).5  However, a conviction for such offense is 
                     
4A review of the allegations in Charge I (Conspiracy), appears to 
indicate that the offense which is the subject of the conspiracy 
was for the offenses described in Charge III (Violation or 
Failure to Obey Lawful General Order or Regulation and 
Dereliction in Performance of Duties). (App. at 199-200.) The 
maximum punishment for conspiracy is the maximum punishment 
authorized for the offense which is the object of the conspiracy. 
See Part IV of the Manual for Courts-Martial ¶ 5(e).  Under our 
analysis, the charge of conspiracy in this case would carry with 
it a maximum punishment of two years and six months. (See App. at 
70 (Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's First Request for 
Admissions and Interrogatories).) 
5Section 803(b) provides: 
Each person discharged from the armed forces 
who is later charged with having fraudulently 
obtained his discharge, is, subject to 
section 843 of this title (article 43), 
subject to trial by court-martial on that 
charge . . . . Upon conviction of that charge 
he is subject to trial by court-martial for 
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needed under § 803(b) before a servicemember can be tried for 
other prior offenses.  Hence, we do not feel it appropriate to 
consider the charge of Fraudulent Separation when reviewing the 
applicability of § 803(a).6 
 As to the charge of making a false official statement, 
we find no evidence in the record to show that Plaintiff could 
not have been tried in another court in the United States for an 
offense of similar import.  Accordingly, we hold that Plaintiff's 
case does not fall within the statutory exception of § 803(a). 
 
B.  Plaintiff's Recall Under § 802(d) 
 Defendants invoked 10 U.S.C. § 802(d) to achieve 
personal jurisdiction over Plaintiff and subject him to trial by 
court-martial.  They contend that § 802(d) "expressly authorizes 
the recall of reservists for investigation and court-martial with 
respect to offenses committed on active duty" even if committed 
in the regular component.  Of course, in Plaintiff's case, this 
argument must presuppose that there was no break in Plaintiff's 
                                                                  
all offenses under this chapter committed 
before the fraudulent discharge. 
10 U.S.C. § 803(b) (1988). 
6It appears that Plaintiff initially was not charged with 
Fraudulent Separation. See Murphy v. Garrett, 729 F. Supp. 461, 
471 n.12 (W.D. Pa. 1990).  We do not feel compelled to address 
the applicability of § 803(b) because the record indicates 
§802(d) was used by Defendants as the basis for jurisdiction over 
Plaintiff.  More important, the charge for Fraudulent Separation 
was never adjudicated in the military court but was dismissed as 
part of the plea agreement.  Thus, if § 803(b) was used to effect 
jurisdiction over Plaintiff, we would question whether, under the 
present circumstances, the military had jurisdiction to convict 
Plaintiff on the two charges to which he ultimately pleaded 
guilty in that the jurisdictional prerequisite of § 803(b), i.e., 
a conviction for Fraudulent Separation, was never met. 
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status under the Code upon his "simultaneous" resignation from 
the regular component and acceptance of a reserve commission. 
However, we have rejected this position.   
 The only other plausible argument for continuing 
jurisdiction over Plaintiff is that § 802(d) acts as an 
independent exception to Hirshberg.  We note that Defendants have 
never expressly argued that § 802(d) acts as such an exception. 
But cf. Murphy v. Garrett, 29 M.J. 469, 472 (C.M.A. 1990) 
(Everett, C.J., and Sullivan, J., concurring).  Instead, 
Defendants have conceded that had Plaintiff experienced a two-day 
lapse in time between his discharge and acceptance of the reserve 
commission, court-martial jurisdiction would have been lost. 
Obviously, this concession militates against Defendants' position 
because, as we noted earlier, the Supreme Court expressly stated 
in Hirshberg that, "jurisdiction to punish rarely, if ever, rests 
upon such illogical and fortuitous contingencies." Hirshberg, 336 
U.S. at 214.  Despite our earlier holding that Plaintiff's status 
under the Code terminated upon his discharge from the regular 
component, we feel compelled to ask whether § 802(d) is an 
exception to Hirshberg.   
 Section 802(d) provides a mechanism for the recall of 
reservists to active duty when the offense was committed while 
the member was (A) on active duty; or (B) on inactive duty 
training. See 10 U.S.C. § 802(d)(1) & (2) (1988).  Defendants 
argue that "active duty" means any period of active duty 
performed by Plaintiff.  We observe that the term "active duty" 
in § 802(d)(2)(A) can support the argument that Plaintiff is 
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subject to military jurisdiction for the offenses previously 
committed while on active duty in the regular component. However, 
§ 802(d)(2)(A), when read in light of the former §803(a), could 
just as well support the argument that the Marines could not 
recall Plaintiff for offenses committed prior to his honorable 
discharge from the regular component unless an exception can be 
met, i.e., the two requirements of § 803(a). Cf. Hirshberg, 336 
U.S. at 261.   
 In the Court of Military Appeals in this case, the 
court found that the term "active duty" should be given its plain 
and ordinary meaning and encompass active duty in both the 
regular and reserve components. Murphy, 29 M.J. at 470.  However, 
with the exception of Murphy, there is no case law interpreting 
"active duty" in § 802(d)(2)(A).  We recognize that ruling of the 
military court as persuasive authority, nonetheless, we are not 
bound by its holdings.  Necessarily then, we undertake the task 
of statutory interpretation.   
 The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated: "Where . . . 
the resolution of a question of federal law turns on a statute 
and the intention of Congress, we look first to the statutory 
language and then to the legislative history if the statutory 
language is unclear."  Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984); 
see also Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1085 (3d Cir. 
1995).  Contrary to Defendants' position, we find the language of 
§ 802(d) unclear.  Hence, we turn to the statute's legislative 
history. 
1.  Legislative History of § 802(d) 
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 In 1984, the Court of Military Appeals decided the case 
of United States v. Caputo, 18 M.J. 259 (C.M.A. 1984).  Caputo, a 
reservist on active duty, was arrested and held by civilian 
authorities.  Weeks later, Caputo reported for his regularly 
scheduled inactive duty training.  He was advised of the charges 
against him stemming from the earlier incident and ordered into 
pretrial confinement.  Caputo's commanding officer extended 
Caputo's inactive-duty training status for an indefinite time to 
facilitate prosecution of the charges and Caputo contested court-
martial jurisdiction. Id. at 261. 
 The Court of Military Appeals held that at the time of 
the alleged offense, Caputo was in a status which subjected him 
to military jurisdiction.  However, that status was terminated by 
his release from active duty training, notwithstanding, his 
subsequent return to inactive-duty training.  This "hiatus" of 
being subject to the Code precluded court-martial jurisdiction 
unless an exception to the Hirshberg rule applied. Id. at 266. As 
no exception applied, personal jurisdiction was found to be 
lacking.  The court called on Congress to consider "whether 
express authority should be granted for the Armed Services to 
order a reservist to active-duty for purposes of court-martial 
with respect to an offense that occurred during an earlier period 
of military service and which falls within the purview of Article 
3(a)." Id. at 267-68.  Congress responded to the court's 
suggestion with the enactment of both §§ 802(d) and 803(d).7  
                     
7Section 803(d) provides: 
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 The legislative history of §§ 802(d) and 803(d) 
indicates that the amendments "would conform [the UCMJ] to the 
military's total-force policy by subjecting members of the 
reserve components in Federal status to the same disciplinary 
standards as their regular-component counterparts." H.R. Rep. No. 
718, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 225 (1986)[hereinafter "H.R. 
Rep."].  Among other things, the House Report of the legislation 
indicates: 
The proposed amendments . . . permit the call 
or order to active duty of a member of the 
reserve component for the purpose of 
disciplinary action; and correct the lapse of 
jurisdiction over an offense committed by a 
reservist during a period of duty that ends 
before the offense is discovered.  
 
 . . . .  
 
 The amendments would also permit the 
call or order to active duty members of 
reserve components for investigation under 
Article 32 [of the UCMJ], for trial by court-
martial, or for nonjudicial punishment. 
Presently, no statutory authority exists to 
call or order reservists to active duty 
solely for disciplinary purposes, even when 
they are otherwise amenable to the 
jurisdiction of the [UCMJ].   
 
 The amendments would further, bridge the 
jurisdictional gap identified in United 
States v. Caputo . . . .  
 
                                                                  
A member of a reserve component who is subject to this 
chapter is not, by virtue of the termination of a 
period of active duty or inactive-duty training, 
relieved from amenability to the jurisdiction of this 
chapter for an offense against this chapter committed 
during such period of active duty or inactive-duty 
training. 
 
     10 U.S.C. § 803(d) (1992). 
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H. Rep. at 226-27. 
 The legislative history of these amendments is quite 
telling.  This history coupled with the language of the 
amendments leads us to believe that §§ 802(d) and 803(d) were 
intended to work jointly and enacted in direct response to Caputo 
to "bridge the jurisdictional gap" presented in that case.  The 
enactment of § 802(d) was to provide a mechanism to call or order 
reservists to active duty solely for disciplinary purposes in 
cases such as Caputo in order to satisfy the personal 
jurisdiction requirement of court-martial jurisdiction.  And, the 
enactment of § 803(d) created one more exception to Hirshberg; 
this time to act as a continuing grant of jurisdiction over 
reservists for offenses committed while on active duty "in the 
reserves," notwithstanding, a termination of such active duty. 
Nowhere is there evidence of a congressional intent to subject a 
reservist to court-martial jurisdiction for offenses committed on 
active duty while in the regular component.  More  to the fact, 
the legislative history shows no evidence of an intent to reach 
beyond the situation faced in Caputo to reach a result 
inconsistent with Hirshberg. 
 Curiously, in the Court of Military Appeals in Murphy, 
the concurrence suggested that while the exercise of military 
jurisdiction over Plaintiff may be inconsistent with the result 
reached in Hirshberg, Congress was free to change such result. 29 
M.J. at 472 (Everett, C.J., and Sullivan, J., concurring). 
Apparently, the concurrence believed that Congress had indeed 
done so.  However, the congressional history shows that Congress 
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did not intend to change the result in Hirshberg.  The House 
Report on the legislation reads: 
With respect to the proposed amendment of 
Article 3, the committee intends not to 
disturb the jurisprudence of United States ex 
rel. Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336. U.S. 210 
(1949). 
 
H. Rep. at 227.   
 Thus, we hold the term "active duty" in 10 U.S.C. 
§802(d)(2)(A) refers to those periods of active duty served by a 
reservist while performing such duty in the reserves.  Moreover, 
§ 802(d) does not act as an independent exception to the 
Hirshberg doctrine. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 The order of the district court will be vacated, and 
the case remanded for further appropriate proceedings. 
 
___________________________ 
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Michael A. Murphy v. John H. Dalton et. al., No. 95-3183 
 
MANSMANN, dissenting. 
 I respectfully dissent because I would hold that the 
military did, in fact and in law, have continuing jurisdiction 
over Murphy to subject him to recall to active duty and 
subsequent court-martial.  Consistent with Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, I find that the circumstances surrounding Murphy's 
discharge from the regular component of the Marine Corps and his 
acceptance of a commission in the Marine Corps Reserve did not 
constitute a true break in service.  Assuming arguendo that such 
a break did occur, however, I would hold that Congress intended, 
with the enactment of the 1986 amendments to 10 U.S.C. §802 and 
10 U.S.C. §803, more specifically 10 U.S.C. §802(d) and 10 U.S.C. 
§803(d), to integrate the reserve components into the total-force 
policy of the military by subjecting members of the reserve 
components to the same disciplinary standards as their regular 
component counterparts. 
 
I.   
  Irrespective of whether Murphy did not have further 
military obligation to the Marine Corps as a matter of law, the 
fact remains that, as the majority opinion states, he requested 
and accepted, simultaneously with his discharge, a commission as 
a reserve officer and transferred to the Marine Corps Reserve. 
Therefore, consistent with United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. 
Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 (1949), no actual physical break in service 
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occurred which would have created a lapse in status during which 
Murphy was not subject to military jurisdiction.  This is 
consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Hirshberg that the 
Navy did not have court-martial jurisdiction over a member of its 
regular component who was honorably discharged and who re-
enlisted the next day for offenses allegedly committed during an 
initial term of enlistment.  The fact that Murphy did not join a 
reserve unit immediately is not compelling in that he accepted 
the commission as a reserve officer simultaneously with his 
discharge from the regular component.  Further, although 
Plaintiff received a DD-214 (Honorable Discharge Certificate), 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice delineates exceptions to the 
rule that "delivery of the discharge certificate terminates 
status."  These exceptions include re-enlistment discharges, 
Article 3(a) offenses8, and fraudulent discharge.9  I would first 
                     
8We note that the government does not raise the issue of 
continuing jurisdiction under §803(a) in its brief as all of the 
charges to which Murphy pled guilty pursuant to the plea 
agreement individually carried a period of confinement of less 
than five years.  However, the language of §803(a) specifically 
addresses those actions with which a "...person [is] charged with 
having committed...." and not the charges for which a person is 
ultimately convicted.  
9
 Fraudulent discharge involves the member of the 
military who obtained the discharge on fraudulent pretenses.  It 
does not appear that the government is relying on this exception 
in this appeal.   
 
 As noted in the majority opinion, the record is not 
clear as to whether the charges as originally raised against 
Murphy contained the charge of Fraudulent Discharge.  The General 
Court Martial-Order dated November 5, 1990 which listed the 
disposition of all of the charges as ultimately raised against 
Murphy does contain a charge for alleged false representations 
and concealment of facts material to separation from the Funded 
Legal Education Program and subsequent misrepresentations to a 
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apply the exception for re-enlistment discharges, which refers to 
the practice of discharging a member of the military at the 
termination of the period of enlistment or earlier, and then 
immediately re-enlisting the member.   
 With respect to the second exception to the Code rule 
that "delivery of the discharge certificate terminates status" --
Article 3(a) offenses, 10 U.S.C. §803 permits military 
prosecution if the member of the military is not on active duty 
status at the time of the court-martial but the alleged offense 
which occurred prior to the discharge is not actionable in any 
civilian court and the punishment for the action is incarceration 
for a period of five or more years.  Of the charges raised 
against Murphy, fraudulent separation and false official 
statements individually carried a punishment of five or more 
years confinement.  In addition, fraudulent separation is not a 
charge for which a person may be tried "in the courts of the 
United States or of a State, a Territory, or the District of 
Columbia..." pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §803(a).10  As a result, I 
would hold that the jurisdictional requirements of §803(a) were 
met and Murphy was indeed a member of the military subject to the 
                                                                  
superior which procured a separation from the regular component 
of the United States Marine Corps.     
 
     Pursuant to a plea agreement, Murphy pled guilty to two 
of the five charges; the remaining three charges, including the 
charge of fraudulent discharge, were withdrawn by the Government. 
10The discussion of the charge of fraudulent discharge is limited 
herein as it applies to the Article 3(a) offenses exception and 
not as the charge may apply to a basis of jurisdiction under 10 
U.S.C. §803(b).    
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Uniform Code of Military Justice both at the time the alleged 
offenses were committed and at the time of the court-martial. 
 Thus, Murphy was eligible to be ordered to active duty 
status because he did not have a break in service and further 
because he falls squarely within exceptions to the delivery of 
the discharge certificate rule. 
   
II. 
 Assuming arguendo that Murphy had a break in service 
between his active duty/regular component status and his reserve 
officer status, I would still hold that he could be ordered to 
active duty for trial by court-martial.  Section 802(d)(1) 
specifically provides that: 
(d)(1)  A member of a reserve component who is not on 
active duty and who is made the subject of proceedings 
under section 815 (article 15) or section 830 (article 
30) with respect to an offense against this chapter may 
be ordered to active duty involuntarily for the purpose 
of -- 
 
(A) investigation under section 832 of this title 
(article 32); 
(B) trial by court-martial; or 
(C) nonjudicial punishment under section 815 of 
this title (article 15). 
 
(2)  A member of a reserve component may not be ordered 
to active duty under paragraph (1) except with respect 
to an offense committed while the member was -- 
(A) on active duty; or 
(B) on inactive-duty training, but in the case of 
members of the Army National Guard of the United 
States or the Air National Guard of the United 
States only when in Federal service. 
*   *   * 
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The plain language of the statute sets forth clearly that Murphy, 
as "a member of a reserve component" may be ordered to active 
duty if he committed an offense "while [he] was on active duty." 
 I cannot find any support in the statute for the 
majority's holding that the term "active duty" should apply only 
to periods of active duty while Murphy was a member of the 
reserve component and not the regular component; the language of 
the statute does not limit or qualify "active duty" in any 
manner.  Indeed, the legislative history of §802(d) as well as 
§803(d) indicates that Congress intended to promote a full 
amalgamation of the reserve component with the regular component 
by expanding court-martial jurisdiction for the reserve 
component.  It was the intent of Congress, with the enactment of 
the 1986 amendments to §802 and §803, to update court-martial 
jurisdiction as it applies to members of the reserve component; 
("The provisions of the UCMJ addressing jurisdiction over 
reservists were drafted more than 35 years ago.  At that time, 
the reserve was viewed as a separate force."  H. Rep. 99-718, 
99th Cong., 2d Sess. p. 226.)  Therefore, it would be 
inconsistent with the total-force concept to hold that a lapse in 
court-martial jurisdiction occurs each time a member of the 
military transfers between components.   
 Most importantly, the House Report states that "[t]he 
proposed amendments would . . . permit the call or order to 
active duty of a member of a reserve component for the purpose of 
disciplinary action; and correct the lapse of jurisdiction over 
an offense committed by a reservist during a period of duty that 
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ends before the offense is discovered."  Id. at 226.  This was in 
direct response to the decision of the Court of Military Justice 
in United States v. Caputo, 18 M.J. 259 (C.M.A. 1984), in which 
jurisdiction over a reservist was relinquished as he was alleged 
to have committed offenses against the UCMJ during one period of 
active duty but the offenses were not discovered or acted upon by 
the military until a subsequent period of active duty.  The 
Caputo example of "fortuitous circumstances" -- and Murphy's 
situation -- are the types of instances which Congress sought to 
address and remedy with the 1986 amendments to the statutes.   
 We recognize the comment in the House Report that 
"[w]ith respect to the proposed amendment of Article 3, the 
committee intends not to disturb the jurisprudence of 
[Hirshberg]."  H. Rep. 99-718, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. p. 227. While 
the Supreme Court in Hirshberg held that a break in service 
terminates court-martial jurisdiction over a member of the 
military, our task is to consider the statutes and amendments of 
§802 and §803 applicable to Murphy to analyze properly his 
situation as a present day member of the reserve component.  In 
finding that Murphy was a member of the military subject to the 
UCMJ both at the time the alleged offenses were committed and at 
the time he was called to court-martial, we are not disturbing 
the jurisprudence of Hirshberg because Hirshberg was not subject 
to Article 3(a) offenses.  As the 1986 amendment §803(d) states: 
A member of the reserve component who is 
subject to this chapter is not, by virtue of 
the termination of a period of active duty or 
inactive-duty training, relieved from 
amenability to the jurisdiction of this 
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chapter for an offense against this chapter 
committed during such period of active duty 
or inactive-duty training. 
 
 10 U.S.C. §803(d) 
 Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the 
district court.   
